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Optimal Regional Conjunctive Water 
Management 
Jay E. Noel, B. Delworth Gardner, and Charles V. Moore 
An optimal control model is used to determine the socially optimal spatial and temporal 
allocation of groundwater and surface water among agricultural and urban uses. The 
control model is described briefly and its advantages over other dynamic models are 
enumerated. Optimal rates of groundwater pumpage over the planning horizon were 
highly sensitive to increasing energy costs. Groundwater basins are shown to react 
differently to alternative economic and hydrological parameters. In a dynamic setting, a 
policy of pump taxes was shown empirically to be superior to pro-rata quotas and 
uncontrolled pumpage. 
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The severe drought in the western United 
States in 1976-78 brought the problems of al- 
locating extremely limited water resources to 
the attention of agriculturalists and urbanites 
alike. Greatly reduced surface water supplies 
exacerbated the already critical pressure on 
remaining groundwater stocks in the same 
areas. 
The chronic overdraft of many western 
states groundwater basins can be attributed 
directly to their common pool nature. The lack 
of explicit property rights to groundwater 
stocks results in individual users of the re- 
source evaluating only their own private 
pumping costs in their decision framework and 
implicitly assigning a zero opportunity cost to 
the stock portion of the resource. Thus, the 
private decision does not take into account 
any user cost and results in a divergence in the 
private and the social optimal rate of pump- 
ing. 1 
The objective of this paper is to describe 
briefly an optimal control model which can be 
used to determine the socially optimal spatial 
and temporal allocation of groundwater and 
surface water among agricultural and urban 
uses. The control model is then applied to a 
representative region of California under sev- 
eral sets of energy costs. Two policies, pro- 
rata allocation and taxation, are evaluated 
empirically as alternatives for accounting for 
externalities due to the common pool problem. 
The Conceptual Framework 
Several authors have investigated the conjunc- 
tive use of groundwater and surface water 
using various techniques. Buras developed a 
dynamic programming algorithm to solve the 
problem of conjunctive use of reservoirs and 
aquifers. His operating policy, however, con- 
sidered the physical system as a single unit 
and thus ignored differences in hydrology that 
occur in a complex groundwater system. Burt 
(1964, 1966, 1967a, b) utilized a mathematical 
programming approach to develop a demand 
function for irrigation water used in a dynamic 
programming formulation of the aquifer man- 
agement problem. Bredehoeft and Young used 
a simulation model to estimate the solution of 
problems involving the development of a 
stream-aquifer system in an economic model 
of irrigation. Bear and Levin studied optimal 
utilization of an aquifer as one element of a 
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1 Scott defines user cost of a natural resource as "the present 
value of future profit foregone by a decision to produce a unit of 
output today." Although this definition is used in the context of a 
profit-maximizing firm, it also applies to the water resource prob- 
lem and refers to the existence value of the stock. 
water resource system. They provided a theo- 
retical framework in which a demand function 
for water is an integral part of an aquifer 
model. Gisser and Mercado (1972, 1973) also 
integrate the demand function for water into a 
hydrologic model. 
The model proposed in this paper is a linear 
quadratic control model (LQCM) and is com- 
posed of two basic parts, (a) an economic 
component and (b) a hydrologic component. 
The economic component contains a derived 
demand model, a stock opportunity cost 
model, and an urban demand model. The de- 
rived demands are obtained from a linear pro- 
gramming model. The use of linear program- 
ming to develop demand functions for agricul- 
tural water is rationalized in Moore and 
Hedges and Gisser. The stock opportunity 
cost model is a set of marginal pumping cost 
functions which are estimated so that the 
stock value of the resource can be derived. 
Finally, urban demand functions were esti- 
mated by an indirect method so that the 
LQCM can allocate water efficiently between 
the two sectors. 
The hydrologic component of the LQCM is 
comprised of a set of equations of motion for 
the surface water reservoirs and groundwater 
basins. The former are estimated from data 
obtained from a surface water hydrology 
model, while the latter are a set of simulta- 
neous equations estimated from data obtained 
from a finite element groundwater model. 
These equations indicate the changes that will 
occur in groundwater depths, given various 
pumping and recharge rates and also account 
for subsurface flow between basins. 
The LQCM maximizes the value of eco- 
nomic components subject to the constraints 
implied by the hydrologic component. This 
particular model extends previous work in 
several ways. First, there is a direct interac- 
tion in the LQCM between a complex multiba- 
sin aquifer-surface water system and the de- 
mands for water. Second, the LQCM is solved 
by an algorithm based on Pontryagin et al. 
maximum principle, which provides an advan- 
tage over other work using dynamic pro- 
gramming, which limits the number of state 
and control variables. Finally, the use of the 
LQCM allows direct calculation of the user 
cost of groundwater. Both Kelso and Renshaw 
discuss the importance of including stock val- 
ues in determining optimal water allocation. 
By using the LQCM, it is possible to maximize 
the value of both the stock and current value 
components of the water resource simulta- 
neously, thereby allowing the calculation of 
the socially optimal spatial and temporal allo- 
cation. 
Application of the Conceptual Framework 
The geographical setting, Yolo County, lo- 
cated in the southwest corner of the Sac- 
ramento Valley, was selected for several rea- 
sons. It provides an example of a region in 
which conjunctive use of groundwater and 
surface water has evolved without any particu- 
lar centralized planning (California Depart- 
ment of Water Resources). Several water 
agencies have areas of jurisdiction within the 
county and most if not all of each agency's 
planning is independent of the others with de- 
cisions being made to maximize private rather 
than overall social value of the water. 
The county has a highly variable supply of 
surface water from Clear Lake, Indian Valley 
Reservoir, and the Sacramento River-Colusa 
Drain complex, used almost exclusively for 
irrigation. Groundwater supplies a more costly 
but more dependable source of water to both 
agricultural and urban users. The aquifer was 
partitioned into six basins for modeling pur- 
poses and follows the work done by hy- 
drologists Scott and Scalmanini. The partition- 
ing permitted the model to allocate water spa- 
tially and took account of unequal pumping 
lifts throughout the aquifer. There was also the 
problem of unequal specific yields throughout 
the aquifer, and the division of the aquifer into 
several basins permitted specification of stor- 
age capacities reflecting yields. The division of 
the aquifer required that the subsurface in- 
flows and outflows between the six basins be 
accounted for in the model. Burt (1974) devel- 
oped an approximately optimal decision rule 
where the subsurface flow between two basins 
in the same aquifer is explicitly contained in 
the model. For the model reported here, the 
subsurface flow is calculated by the groundwa- 
ter model. Thus, the coefficients of the 
groundwater stock variables contain the ef- 
fects of the subsurface flow term. 
The LQCM used for determining allocations 
of water resources in Yolo County can be rep- 
resented as follows: 
(1) Max W = RR'ut - ?ut'Rut 
- KK'yt + yt'Kyt, 
subject to 
(2) Yt = Ayt-1 - But_- + Cxt-1 + d, 
(3) Yt - y*t < 0, 
(4) ut - u*t < 0, and 
(5) Yt 
- 
0 Ut 
- 
0.O 
The welfare function [equation (1)] is an 
explicit economic measure of welfare. It is 
composed of two parts. Producer and con- 
sumer surplus measures the economic value of 
the flow component of the water resource 
base. The consumer surplus is associated with 
the urban sector demand functions, while the 
producer surplus represents economic rent 
available to the agricultural sector.2 The sec- 
ond part is a social surplus for the stock por- 
tion of the water resource base. It measures 
the returns to the stock that could be gained 
from monopoly control. The social surplus in- 
creases as stocks increase and pumping costs 
decrease, ceteris paribus; and, alternatively, 
the social surplus decreases as stocks diminish 
and pumping costs increase. Note that these 
components are inversely related. The con- 
sumer and producer surplus components re- 
late to flows and increase at a diminishing rate 
with increasing water use; however, as water 
use increases stocks diminish and the rents 
associated with this component decrease at an 
increasing rate. Thus, the model maximizes 
the value of the water resource base by equat- 
ing the net marginal value of the flow to the 
opportunity cost or marginal value of the stock 
in that period.3 
The welfare function is subject to two sets 
of constraints. The first set [equation (2)] is 
the equations of motion or first-order differ- 
ence equations describing the physical sys- 
tem. This is a reduced-form system, which in 
this study is a linear approximation to a com- 
plex physical system. A, B, and C are specified 
as time invariant matrices and d is a vector of 
constants. The second set of constraints [equa- 
tions (3), (4), and (5)] respresents the physi- 
cal, institutional, and nonnegativity conditions 
on the stocks and flows of water. These con- 
straints are not applied to every scenario 
posed by the model but rather act as individual 
scenario conditions so that resulting allocation 
patterns and effects on social welfare can be 
observed. 
The Results 
One reason for using an optimal control model 
was that it allowed direct calculation and in- 
terpretation of the user costs associated with 
temporal allocations. Table 1 presents the net 
2 This measure has been used by Samuelson and later 
Takayama and Judge to measure social welfare. Mishan discusses 
the assumptions of this approach to social welfare measurement. 
3 The net marginal value is defined as the marginal value of 
water net of water cost. A more detailed description of the empiri- 
cal model and the analytical necessary conditions for achieving an 
optimal solution is contained in Noel. 
Table 1. Stock User Costs, Net Marginal Values, and Transformed User Costs (1977-2005, 
$0.045/kwh.) 
Value (dollars/acre-foot) 
Groundwater Basin Value Measure 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Cache Creek stock user costs 28.79 23.15 16.19 11.33 7.79 4.93 1.94 
net marginal values 5.68 5.24 3.20 2.24 1.52 0.93 0.26 
transformed user costs 6.01 4.84 3.38 2.37 1.62 1.03 0.40 
Upper Cache-Putah stock user costs 30.00 24.47 17.32 12.06 8.05 4.76 1.67 
net marginal values 8.19 7.64 4.71 3.01 2.14 1.21 0.31 
transformed user costs 8.73 7.12 5.04 3.51 2.34 1.38 0.47 
Plainfield Ridge stock user costs 1,214.10 653.10 241.20 83.57 21.53 0.87 -0.00 
net marginal values 61.13 61.13 61.13 13.06 3.03 -0.0 
=0.00 transformed user costs 240.39 129.32 47.77 16.55 4.26 0.17 =0.00 
Lower Cache-Putah stock user costs 149.58 118.63 79.25 51.08 30.07 15.76 4.53 
net marginal values 9.83 7.81 5.17 3.30 1.94 0.94 0.18 
transformed user costs 10.62 8.42 5.63 3.63 2.13 1.12 0.32 
Colusa stock user costs 27.94 23.18 16.79 12.04 8.50 5.65 2.49 
net marginal values 7.10 5.88 4.25 3.04 1.95 1.37 0.43 
transformed user costs 7.66 6.35 4.60 3.30 2.33 1.55 0.68 
East Yolo stock user costs 12.23 10.06 7.22 5.14 3.60 2.35 0.99 
net marginal values 2.44 2.00 1.41 1.02 0.72 0.44 0.12 
transformed user costs 2.66 2.19 1.57 1.12 0.78 0.51 0.22 
marginal values, stock user costs, and trans- 
formed user costs associated with the 
groundwater allocations listed in table 2. Sur- 
face water stock values are not included in 
table 1 because the surface water distribution 
system constraint limits the amount of surface 
water which can be used in any period to less 
than would have been allocated in the uncon- 
strained solution. This restriction increased 
the net marginal value of the surface water in 
any time period to a level greater than the 
existing reservoir user cost in that time period. 
The stock user cost for all basins except 
Plainfield Ridge can be interpreted as the pres- 
ent value of the loss in social surplus if one 
more acre-foot were allocated for use in the 
specific time period. For example, if one more 
acre-foot of water were used from the Lower 
Cache-Putah basin than is socially optimal, the 
value of the stock would diminish by $149.58. 
The user cost figures given for Plainfield Ridge 
are not an accurate estimate of the true user 
cost because the lower bound constraint on 
the depth of the water table was reached. This 
constraint assumes that the volume of stored 
water associated with a depth greater than 420 
feet is zero. Even though somewhat arbitrary, 
the lack of data on groundwater storage be- 
neath 420 feet made the constraint necessary. 
The transformed user costs are the present 
value of the stock in terms of current use. The 
transformation was made by the model to allo- 
cate water optimally between time periods. 
Note that the transformed user costs and net 
marginal values are approximately equal in 
each time period for each basin except 
Plainfield Ridge. Differences are due to round- 
ing errors associated with use of the algorithm. 
It should be noted that these transformed user 
costs are a measure of the external costs that 
are imposed on other pumpers under the 
common property situation where private de- 
cision making on the part of individual users of 
the groundwater basins is based solely on pri- 
vate rather than the social cost of pumping a 
unit of water. Except for Plainfield Ridge, the 
extreme values of transformed user cost is 
$10.62 for Lower Cache-Putah and $2.66 for 
East Yolo. This indicates that different basins 
even in the same aquifer can exhibit different 
external costs. The magnitude of these costs 
can serve as at least one measure of whether 
or not governmental intervention into the al- 
locative process is warranted. The differences 
Table 2. Optimal Temporal Groundwater and Surface Water Allocations (1977-2005, $0.045/ 
Kwh.) 
(Acre-Feet) 
Groundwater Basin Water Supply 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Cache Creek surface 15,646 15,646 15,646 15,646 15,646 15,646 15,646 
agriculture 
groundwater 47,525 47,586 47,663 47,747 47,926 48,504 50,567 
Upper Cache-Putah surface 91,955 91,955 91,955 91,955 91,955 91,955 91,955 
agriculture 
groundwater 33,859 33,872 33,967 34,251 34,982 36,825 41,361 
urban 
groundwater 1,344 2,073 2,234 2,394 2,394 2,394 2,394 
Plainfield Ridge surface 3,395 3,395 3,395 3,395 3,395 3,395 3,395 
agriculture 
groundwater 0 0 0 7,492 12,879 15,601 0 
Lower Cache-Putah surface 36,605 36,605 36,605 36,605 36,605 36,605 36,605 
agriculture 
groundwater 139,670 141,690 146,050 152,320 161,620 175,700 197,340 
urban 
groundwater 17,763 21,870 24,199 26,503 27,467 29,149 29,149 
Colusa surface 179,130 179,130 179,130 179,130 179,130 179,130 179,130 
agriculture 
groundwater 93,909 93,511 93,127 93,023 93,459 96,191 110,580 
East Yolo surface 130,870 130,870 130,870 130,870 130,870 130,870 130,870 
agriculture 
groundwater 59,571 59,548 59,527 59,536 59,628 60,054 61,904 
urban 
groundwater 8,289 10,427 11,051 11,629 12,926 13,528 13,528 
in net marginal values and also in user costs in 
the six basins indicate potentials for economic 
intra and interbasin transfers of groundwater. 
Table 2 contains the optimal spatial and 
temporal allocation of groundwater and sur- 
face water suggested by the model under a 
4.5g electrical power cost scenario. Several 
observations can be made about these results. 
The amount of groundwater used for agricul- 
tural production generally increases over time. 
Several economic factors determine the tem- 
poral allocation of water in the model. Factors 
which limit the quantity allocated to a specific 
period are (a) increased pumping costs for the 
remainder of the planning horizon for those 
basins having declining water tables and (b) 
lower marginal values from additional quan- 
tities of water used in that time period. The 
factors tending to increase the quantity used 
per period are (a) time preference reflected by 
the discount rate and (b) high net marginal 
values on low rates of water usage. The wide 
range of agricultural groundwater pumpages 
(0.0 to 141,690 acre-feet in 1980) illustrates 
quite dramatically the variability in optimal 
groundwater allocations that can exist in a 
single aquifer when both the economic and 
physical parameters in each basin are consid- 
ered in the decision-making process. 
Table 2 also contains urban groundwater al- 
locations which are based on "need" projec- 
tions. The projections are based on urban 
water requirement studies done by several en- 
gineering consulting firms, and by using an 
urban water projection model developed by 
Savage and Helweg for estimating the impact 
of population and areal growth patterns for 
water use rates for the City of Davis. The 
projections were used as constraints on urban 
allocations because early control model runs, 
based on the hypothetical urban demand func- 
tions estimated for this study, allocated cer- 
tain amounts to the urban areas in excess of 
existing or projected distribution system 
capacity. 
The amount of groundwater needed by 
urban users moves from 6.8% of the total 
amount of groundwater used in all basins in 
1977 to 8.6% of the total by 2,005. This repre- 
sents a small proportion of the total amount of 
groundwater used in any period. Thus, the 
impacts on groundwater stocks by urban 
usage is rather insignificant for any basin as a 
whole. This suggests that concern that urban 
growth will affect adversely agricultural pump- 
age and pumping cost is largely unfounded. 
The surface water allocations shown in table 
2 can be explained by the surface water cost 
used in this model: namely, those that existed 
in 1977 were selected due to the difficulty in 
predicting the future price-setting actions of 
the various agencies allocating surface water. 
Because surface water costs are substantially 
less than groundwater pumping costs, surface 
water allocations depend on the relative net 
marginal values of this water between the var- 
ious basins and on the capacity of the distribu- 
tion system. Surface water allocations are lim- 
ited in every power cost scenario by con- 
straints associated with either reservoir water 
distribution capacity or the amount of surface 
water that can be obtained from the Sac- 
ramento River-Colusa Drain complex. The 
surface water allocations listed in table 2 are 
thus constrained allocations. 
Table 3 contains the groundwater depths 
and surface water stocks associated with the 
optimal allocations contained in table 2. Note 
that in three of the six basins the water table 
decreases over time, while in the remaining 
three it increases. This set of figures indicates 
quite strikingly that treating the whole 
Table 3. Groundwater Depths and Surface Water Stocks (1977-2005, $0.045/Kwh.) 
Depth to Groundwater (feet) 
Groundwater Basin 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Cache Creek 64 69 74 77 80 81 82 
Upper Cache-Putah 41 40 39 38 38 39 39 
Plainfield Ridge 105 119 145 190 262 385 >420 
Lower Cache-Putah 53 56 61 65 71 76 81 
Colusa 55 50 45 42 41 40 41 
East Yolo 20 18 15 13 12 11 11 
Effective Storage (acre-feet) 
Clear Lake 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 315,000 
Indian Valley 138,789 139,574 139,857 139,893 139,893 139,893 139,893 
groundwater basin in Yolo County as an 
aggregate unit would miss the sizeable varia- 
tion in optimal utilization of the groundwater 
in the various basins composing the aquifer. 
These data show that the choice of a planning 
unit for determining optimal water allocations 
is very important. If the unit chosen is too 
large, and a single utilization rate were used 
throughout, groundwater mighe be seriously 
under- or over-utilized. Even more subdivi- 
sion of the aquifer studied might have revealed 
even more variation in optimal utilization 
rates, but further analysis was infeasible. 
Effects of rising energy costs. Energy costs 
can have an important influence on whether 
the model indicates a groundwater basin with 
an increasing or decreasing water table. For 
example, Upper Cache-Putah basin would be 
mined under a 2.6g energy cost assumption 
but would have a rising water table initially 
under the 8g energy cost assumption (fig. 
1). The remaining basins move in the same 
direction as indicated in table 4 at alternative 
energy cost assumptions. In those basins 
where groundwater use exceeds recharge 
under a 4.5g energy cost, the effect of higher 
energy costs is to slow down the rate of min- 
ing. 
Table 4 illustrates the impact increasing 
energy costs have on temporal water alloca- 
tion, using the Cache Creek basin as an exam- 
ple. Surface water allocations depend upon 
the net marginal value of water in a single 
basin relative to the net marginal values in 
other competing basins. For Cache Creek, the 
allocations are reasonably constant over time. 
Groundwater pumpage at any time period de- 
creases as expected as energy costs increase, 
because the net marginal value of water is 
lower and the stock value is higher. 
as 
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Figure 1. Impact of constant energy cost on 
Upper Cache-Putah Basin groundwater depth 
($0.026/kwh. and $0.080/kwh., 1975-2015) 
Policies to Reduce Misallocation 
of Groundwater 
In this section two policies are analyzed em- 
pirically that could be utilized to achieve a 
more socially preferred allocation of ground- 
water. The focus here is on groundwater be- 
cause of the lack of any definitive empirical 
studies which evaluate the impact of various 
policies on the social value of groundwater. 
This is not meant to infer that surface water 
allocation is unimportant. Quite to the con- 
trary, surface water sources supply almost 
one-half the county's agricultural water de- 
mands. 
The control model provided the socially 
efficient allocations of the surface water re- 
source. If contractual arrangements were 
made on a "market value" rather than a 
"first come-first serve" arrangement, then 
Table 4. Increasing Energy Cost Impacts on Temporal Surface and Groundwater Allocations, 
1975-2015--Cache Creek Basin (acre-feet) 
Energy 
Cost Water 
($/Kwh.) Supply 1975 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
0.026 surface water 14,465 14,465 14,465 14,465 14,465 14,465 14,465 14,465 
groundwater 51,714 51,748 51,790 51,850 51,932 52,148 52,887 54,073 
0.045 surface water 15,645 15,645 15,645 15,645 15,645 15,645 15,645 
groundwater 47,525 47,586 47,663 47,747 47,926 48,504 50,567 
0.065 surface water 17,122 17,122 17,122 17,122 17,122 17,122 17,122 
groundwater 42,533 43,012 43,082 43,204 43,566 44,832 47,980 
0.080 surface water 15,793 15,793 15,793 15,793 15,793 15,793 15,793 
groundwater 38,949 38,990 39,040 39,158 39,550 40,952 44,450 
surface water would move toward a more so- 
cially efficient allocation. For example, if ag- 
ricultural producers were allowed to bid for 
available water supplies, assured full property 
rights and perfect competition, they would bid 
the price up to the level of the marginal value 
of water utilized in production. Because the 
control model is based on exactly this type of 
allocation procedure, it is expected that sur- 
face allocation resulting from the "water mar- 
ket" arrangement would approximate the so- 
cially optimum allocation indicated by the 
control model. 
The pro-rata groundwater policy. The pro- 
rata method is one that attacks the common 
pool problem by adjudicating annual ground- 
water quotas to overlying landowners. The 
quota most often recommended is established 
by restricting pumpage to the long-run mean 
recharge rate. This suggests that no mining of 
the resource should be permitted on the aver- 
age. 
Table 5 provides a comparison of the total 
value of the groundwater resource for the en- 
tire Yolo County aquifer under socially op- 
timum conditions (no restrictions on temporal 
allocations of the resource in any basin) as 
opposed to a quota system, where the quota is 
limited to the mean recharge rate. This com- 
parison is made under two energy cost 
scenarios and the results under both energy 
cost runs indicate that using a quota di- 
minishes the potential social benefits to be de- 
rived from the resource. The 4.5g energy cost 
scenario shows a much wider divergence from 
the optimal social value, however, than does 
the 6.5o energy cost scenario. The percentage 
loss of social value under the 4.50 energy 
scenario ranges from 11% to 6% over the 
planning horizon, while for the 6.5e energy 
scenario the range is only 4.4% to 1.1%. As 
energy costs increase and the optimal amount 
of water to be used in any single period de- 
clines, the quota system comes closer to ap- 
proximating the social value of the resource on 
a basin-wide basis. 
From the above it is obvious that quotas will 
be least inefficient where the amount of water 
mining in the optimal allocation is small in 
relation to recharge. However, quotas always 
will be suboptimal if any economic mining of 
the resource is optimal, and their inefficiency 
will increase as transaction costs are taken 
into consideration. These costs would be in 
the form of administrating and policing the 
quota policy. The quota values listed in table 5 
include none of these costs, and thus must be 
viewed as upper bounds and the differences 
are biased downwards. It should be noted here 
that this situation is not unique for quota poli- 
cies. Any policy which controls the use of a 
common property resource in a more socially 
preferred manner probably would require a 
new institutional structure and therefore 
would require new transaction costs. 
Laissez-faire groundwater policy. The in- 
clusion of transaction costs in the calculus of 
considering policy changes creates the possi- 
bility that the status quo may offer the "best" 
that can be done in terms of maximizing the 
social value of the water resource. Table 6 
compares the value of the groundwater of 
Yolo County under a purely private de- 
cision-making situation where each pumper 
decides independently how much water to 
take from the aquifer and the socially efficient 
situation where the negative externalities as- 
sociated with private actions are taken into 
consideration. The user cost or stock value is 
assigned a zero value to represent the private 
allocation situation. 
There is a large difference between the so- 
Table 5. Yearly and Total Present Value of the Water Resource under Socially Efficient and 
Quota Allocations (1977-2010, $0.045/Kwh. and $0.065/Kwh.) 
Energy 
Cost Value 
($/Kwh.) Measure 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Totala 
- - - ------------------------ ($ thousand) - 
0.045 Social 22,122 16,860 12,820 9,230 6,150 4,710 3,350 294,240 
Quota 19,619 15,224 11,710 8,530 5,730 4,410 3,150 268,750 
Difference 2,493 1,636 1,110 700 420 300 200 25,490 
0.065 Social 19,185 13,781 9,840 7,160 5,160 3,720 2,830 259,160 
Quota 18,292 13,696 9,640 7,040 5,090 3,670 2,800 252,410 
Difference 893 412 200 120 70 50 30 6,750 
a Represents total value of the water resource over the entire planning horizon. 
Table 6. Yearly and Total Present Value of the Water Resource under Socially Efficient and 
Private Decision Allocations (1977-2005, $0.045/Kwh.) 
Value 
Measure 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Totala 
($ thousand) 
Social 22,112 16,860 12,820 9,230 6,150 4,410 3,120 294,240 
Private 18,068 14,694 10,485 7,174 5,103 3,612 2,565 241,322 
Difference 4,044 2,166 2,335 2,056 1,047 798 555 52,918 
a Represents total value of the water resource over the entire planning horizon. 
cial optimum and the private optimum value of 
the water resource, much larger than the dif- 
ference between the social optimum and the 
quota solution described above. These differ- 
ences, however, are not directly comparable 
because they measure different things. The 
difference between the quota and the social- 
ly optimum value represents the returns 
foregone if the amount of groundwater usage 
is limited to a long-run mean recharge quota. 
The unrestricted pumping value is a measure 
of the external cost imposed on all water users 
by the failure of individual pumpers to take 
into account the total social costs of individual 
pumping. The total difference between the so- 
cial optimum and the private solution is 
$52,918,000 over the thirty-year-planning 
horizon. In comparing the unrestricted solu- 
tion to the quota policy solution, it must be 
concluded that neither policy is efficient. 
However, the quota policy appears better to 
approximate the social optimum than does the 
unrestricted pumping policy. Thus, a policy to 
control groundwater use appears to be jus- 
tified if the transaction costs are less than the 
costs of the externalities. Thus, even though it 
has been shown that the long-run recharge 
quota is not a "good" policy for reaching the 
true social value of the water resource, it can 
be used to control allocations so that the nega- 
tive externalities are taken into consideration. 
It appears, therefore, that a good case can 
be made for limiting the water pumped from 
the aquifer, unless there are opportunities for 
economically efficient transfers among basins 
on the surface through a market transfer pro- 
cess. If so, continued overdrafting would be 
justified only if the value of the transferred 
water at the margin were higher than the sum 
of the user costs, pumping costs, and transfer 
costs. 
Pumping tax policy. An alternative policy 
for managing a groundwater basin that suffers 
from the problem of commonality of use is to 
levy a tax on pumping. This is a widely pro- 
posed solution to correct a divergence be- 
tween private and social costs (Pigou). In this 
case the marginal private cost is simply the 
marginal cost of pumping to individual users. 
The marginal social cost includes as well the 
loss of productivity to individual users be- 
cause of competitive pumping. The dominant 
problem with Pigovian solutions is the selec- 
tion of the correct tax (Baumol). Milliman 
demonstrates that if the marginal value of a 
unit of water pumped is equated to the margi- 
nal social cost of pumping the water that a 
social optimum has been reached. 
The necessary condition for the empirical 
model to allocate water optimally requires that 
the net marginal value of a unit of water used 
be equated to the transformed user cost. Be- 
cause the marginal private pumping costs al- 
ready have been subtracted from the marginal 
values, the transformed user cost actually 
measures the difference between the marginal 
social and marginal private cost of pumping a 
unit of water. As such, it represents the opti- 
mal marginal tax rate that is required to force 
private and social costs to converge. 
Table 7 contains the optimal tax under a 
4.5o energy cost scenario. The results listed in 
the table indicate that the optimal tax structure 
is not a fixed levy over the entire planning 
horizon, but is rather a declining set of tax 
rates. The table results raise other issues. 
First, all tax rates are positive. At first glance 
this may appear somewhat surprising given 
that three of the six basins indicate rising 
water tables after the 4.50 energy cost has 
been reached. Even with rising water tables, 
however, if an individual pumper did not 
extract a unit of water, the water table would 
rise somewhat higher than if the unit of water 
were extracted. This extraction thus increases 
the pumping costs of the other individuals 
using the aquifer. 
In addition, the tax rates show a wide range 
Table 7. Optimal Tax Rate Schedule for the Yolo County Groundwater Basins (1977-2000, 
$0.045/Kwh.) 
Groundwater Basin 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
-------------------------------- Tax ($/acre-feet) ------------------------- 
Cache Creek 6.01 4.84 3.38 2.37 1.62 1.03 
Upper Cache-Putah 8.73 7.12 5.04 3.51 2.34 1.38 
Plainfield Ridge 240.39 129.32 47.77 16.55 4.26 0.17 
Lower Cache-Putah 10.62 8.42 5.62 3.63 2.13 1.12 
Colusa 7.66 6.35 4.60 3.30 2.33 1.55 
East Yolo 2.66 2.19 1.57 1.12 0.78 0.51 
of values, depending on several factors: (a) 
the physical parameters of the individual ba- 
sins; (b) the costs associated with pumping a 
unit of groundwater; and (c) the economic 
demands for current use (both for agriculture 
and urban use). 
Finally, the tax rate declines over time 
under constant energy costs, a result to be 
expected since over time the stock values 
(user costs) decline. This reduces the disparity 
between the restricted pumping situation and 
the socially optimal allocation, and the tax rate 
correspondingly declines. 
From an analytical viewpoint the two meth- 
ods of dealing with commonality of water use 
offer very different lines of attack. Quota set- 
ting in effect imposes a tighter constraint on 
the resource than does taxation. Quota setting 
transfers the decision making from the private 
user to a central agency. Taxation allows 
greater flexibility because the decision on 
pumpage is left to the individual user. The tax 
simply becomes another component of the 
pumper's cost function and is taken into con- 
sideration when deciding how much water 
should be used in any time period. Baumol 
demonstrates that where an externality (tech- 
nical) exists that taxes upon the generator of 
the externality are all that is required to pro- 
duce an efficient allocation. Baumol argues 
that even if the level of taxation needs to be 
adjusted in a tatonnement process to achieve 
the desired result, it is still the best way to 
correct the divergence between social and pri- 
vate cost. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has proposed a control model 
framework for determining the optimal spatial 
and temporal allocation of water in a complex 
hydrologic and economic setting. The advan- 
tage of this framework over past work done in 
the area of water resource allocation is the 
ability of the model to handle a large degree of 
disaggregation and to provide valuable eco- 
nomic and hydrologic information about the 
physical system with respect to its common 
pool nature. Thus, this paper demonstrates the 
usefulness of a framework that can take the 
interaction of several groundwater basins into 
consideration as the socially optimum alloca- 
tions are determined& Two broad policy impli- 
cations can be drawn from the results. 
First, the areal size of a water resource- 
planning unit must be chosen with care. The 
results presented in this paper illustrate quite 
dramatically that the six basins making up the 
Yolo County aquifer react differently to alter- 
native economic and hydrologic parameters. 
In terms of policy, this means that designation 
of groundwater planning units should be based 
on economic and hydrologic parameters and 
not on political or geographical boundaries. 
The degree of hydrologic interdependence be- 
tween different basins in the same aquifer, or 
between aquifers, is the key factor in deter- 
mining any planning unit. These interdepen- 
dencies are directly related to the common 
pool problem associated with groundwater 
use. If the interdependencies are not ac- 
counted for in the allocation decision, there 
will be a large reduction in the social value of 
the groundwater resource. 
The second policy implication relates to the 
economic impacts associated with policy al- 
ternatives for moving current groundwater al- 
locations to a more socially preferred set. Al- 
though taxation and pro-rata allocations have 
been suggested a number of times in the litera- 
ture as institutional instruments to achieve a 
more socially optimal allocation of resources, 
the current framework has shown the change 
in social value of the resource that can be 
expected upon their implementation. The re- 
sults indicate that both instruments will in- 
crease the social value of the groundwater re- 
source but that if any mining of the resource is 
contemplated, that taxation provides for the 
greatest social value of the groundwater being 
achieved. 
[Received June 1979; revision accepted 
December 1979.] 
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